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Human Capacities and the Proble1n of
Universally Equal Dignity: Two Philosophical
Test Cases and a Theistic Response
Matthew Petrusek

F

EW WORDS IN CONTEM PORARY MORAL DISCOURSE have the

sa me immediate traction as the term " human dignity." Po liticians, lawyers, preac hers and priests, human rights advocates,
academic theorists, and campaigners of all stripes regu larly
appeal to dignity as the foundationa l warrant for their manifold causes,
even when they bitterly di sagree with each other. ft may not always
be the first claim in the chain of reason ing, but, if all else fa ils, it frequently ends up being the last. Why, for example, should poverty be
erad icated? "Because it is an affront to human d ign ity," activists tell
us. Why should foreign dictators be toppled? "So the uni versal yearning fo r human dignity can break free ," say opposition leaders and their
international supporters. Why shou ld thi s hea lthcare, or housing, or
debt-forgiveness bill be passed? "Because dign ity calls for no less,"
protcstors cla mor. Or why should stem cell resea rch be funded? "Because it advances human d ignity," say researchers. Why shou ld it be
proh ibited? "Because it undermines human dignity ," respond church
leaders. Many agree that animal-human hybrids pose a threat to human
dignity. But some a lso mainta in that all eged unfa ir labor practices,
whi ch , depending on the political platform, may in clude insufficient
paid vacation time, do the same. An organization call ed "Dignitas" in
Switzerland offers its clients what it ca ll s "death with di gnity," a common euphemis m for assisted suicide. Opponents argue that such a
practice constitutes a grave vio lation of human di gnity itself.
Indeed, human dignity not only li es at the heart of a potpourri of
moral di sputcs--oft:cn with each side claiming th at it is the one "true"
defender or advancer of human worth- but also serves as the foundational bal last of entire charters and declarations. The first article of the
Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Un ion , fo r
example, asserts, "Human dignity is invio labl e. It must be respected
and protected." 1 The earl ier and more internationa ll y recogni zed
1
·'Charter of Fund ament a l Ri ghts of th e Eu ropean Uni on," Office .Journal of the European Communities 364 (2000) :9.

38

Matthew Petrusek

United Nations document, The Un iversal Declaration of Human
Rights, commences si milarly: "[th e] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienabl e rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom , j ustice and peace in the
world." 2 Confirming the ethical centrality of di gnity to the document,
article one goes on to affirm, "All human beings arc born free and
equal in dignity and rights." Remarkably, when th e fina l form of The
Declaration was approved in December of 1948, on ly eight nations
abstained from approving it, and not one di ssentcd. 3 Though divided
into Communist and non-Communi st blocks and still ravaged by the
effects of World-War II , almost the entire world came together (at
least on paper) to recognize the existence o f uni versa l human worth.
Rarely has the global community seen such consensus- a consensus
that over 60 years later appears to conti nue growing, at least on empirical grounds .4
To be sure, some prominent naysayers have emerged along the way.
The util itarian philosopher Peter Singer has long provided readers
with a meticulously crafted case against the existence of human worth,
arguing that it amounts to an unjustified for;n of di scrimination he
calls "spccicsism." 5 The Harvard psycho logist Steven Pinker has also
2

The Un ited Nations, ''The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," www.un. org/
cn/documents/udhr/ .
3
The Uni ted Nations, ''History of the Document," www. un.org/cn/documents/udhr/hi story.shtml. It is a lso interesting to note that artic le one o f the 1949 and
1990 German Constitut ions (the text was amended in part allc r the 1990 unifi cation
of West and East Germany) reads, " D ie WLirdc des Me nsch en isl un anlastbar. Sic zu
achten und zu schi.itzcn ist Vcrpfli chtung all cr staatlichcn Gcwalt. " Translated: " Human dignity is un assa ilable. To respect and protect it is th e duty of a ll state authority."
See The German Government, "Grund gcsctz fiir d ie Bundcsrcpublik Dcu tschl and,"
www.gcsetze-im-intcrnct.de/bundcsrccht/gg/gcsamt.pdf.
Even if one agrees with the claims in the German Co nstitut ion and The U ni versal
!he conception of
Declaration of Human Rights and I think most people would
di gnity in th ese documents remains deeply prob lematic because it is in no way clea r,
in either document, how or why human dignity ca n be bot h universall y and inherently
equal while also being so methi ng that needs to be protected. Certain ly dec larations
and constitutions do not bear the burden of exhausti ve ly justifying !heir first principles; but the problem is that the first principles, in these cases, appear to be co ntrad ictory at least without substantia l add itional e laboration and explanat ion .
4
The 1989 United Nations Treaty, "Convention on the Rights o f the Chi ld," for exam ple, also includ es language recogn izing the "fundamental. ... dign ity and worth of
the person" (sec The United Nati ons, "Conventio n on !he Rights of the Child,"
www.ohchr.org/en/profcssionalintcrest/pagcs/crc.aspx). Acco rd ing to the U nited Nations webs ite, 194 cou ntries arc cu rrent ly a party to th e trea ty. ln!crcstingly, the United
States has signed the treaty, but has not yet ratified it (sec The Uni ted Nations, "Treaty
Collection," https://trcaties.un.o rg/Pagcs/V icwDctai ls.aspx?src= TREt\ TY & mtdsg_
no=IV-1 I &chaptcr=4&Jang=cn).
5
Singer's writ ing provides a multitude of quotable materi al on thi s point, but here is
a succinct expression : 'The doctr ine of the sanctity of human Ii re, as it is norma ll y
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recently come out against the va lidity of human dignity as an ontological or ethical principle; in 2008 he wrote an influential article in Th e
New Repuhlic- polcmically entitled, "The Stupidity of Human Dignity" -that lambastes the use of dignity as a basis for making mora l
judgments, especially in biocthics. 6 So it is certainly inaccurate to say
that the belief in human dignity is anywhere near universal, either inside or outside the academy.
But it is certainly widespread, even global. Just imagine getting
elected or holding a prominent position- or, for that matter, being accepted among polite company- in most parts of the world wh il e publicall y denying the ex istence of equal human worth. Not even far left
environmental parties who sec humanity as a threat to the planet or far
right cu ltural purity parties who sec certain ethn ic, religious, or racia l
groups as a threat to civi li zation make that claim, at least open ly. Call
it, to borrow from John Rawls, an overlapping consensus.
But why the agreement? And what, exactly, is the agreement about?
Peek beneath the near unanimity on human di gni ty's ex istence, and it
quickly becomes apparent that there is a great di versity, if not cacophony, of viewpoints on dignity 's origin, speci fi e character, and ethical
imp lications. Indeed, like many other deeply loaded mora l terms
("fairness" is another good examp le), what human dignity enjoys in
general acceptance, it frequently lacks in clarity and coherence, a reality thi s article' s introductory examples seek to capturc.7

understood , has at its co re a di sc rimination on the basis of species and nothi ng else"
(sec Peter S inger, Unsanr.:tijj,ing Human Life, ed. Helga Kuhse [Ma lden, Ma : Blackwe ll Publishin g, 2002], 22 1). S inge r offers a susta ined critique in this text not only of
th e c laim that humans ha ve unique va lue his und erstanding o f that which bestows
worth on a li v ing bein g has roots in Jeremy Bentham' s fomous query : "The questi on
is not can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they surfe r?" but also of the claim
that humans have uniqu e ly equal worth . All attempts by theologians and philosophers
to establish universa ll y eq ual human di gnity have Je ll him th oroughly unconv inced:
"[The] appeal to th e intrinsic di gnity of human beings appea rs to solve the cgalita rian's problems on ly as long as it goes unchallen ged. O nce we ask why it shou ld be
th at all humans including infants, mental de fecti ves, psychopath s, Hitler, Stalin and
the rest have some kind of di gnity or worth that nu e lephant, pig, or chimpanzee can
ever achi eve, we sec that thi s qu estion is as difficu lt tu answer as our original request
for so me re levant fact that justifies the inequ ality or humans and oth er animals"
(Si nger, Unsanr.:ti/ying Human Life, 9 1).
<, Pinker writes, fo r exa mp le, "The prob lem is that ' di gnily ' is a squ ishy, subject ive
not ion , hard ly up to the heavyweight mora l demands ass igned to it. " He argues that
·'autonomy," in contrast, has an objective, fi xed meanin g, and shou ld be used in mora l
discourse rather than "d ignity." Sec Steven Pinker, "The Stupid ity of Human Dignity", Th e Ne w Republic, May 28, 2008, http ://pinkcr.wj h.harvarcl. edu/ art iclcs/mcdia/Thc%20Stupidit y%2 0o1%20Dignity.htm.
7 Another instru ct ive way to sec the co nceptua l e last ic it y of human worth in action is
to search for " human dignity" on the White House's wcbpagc. There arc nut on ly
hundreds of results from di ffc rcnt speec hes, rcrnark s, executive ord ers, etc., but the
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Several books and articles have recently emerged addressing th is
basic defin itional problem. The more prominent include political theorist Michael Rosen's Dignity: Its History and Meaning, philosopher
George Katcb 's Human Dignity, and theological ethicist G ilbert Meilaendcr's Neither Beast Nor God: The Dignity of the Human Person,
as well as an excellent seri es of essays in Human Dignity and Bioethics. Each text distinctively addresses the problematic status of "human
worth" in contemporary moral discourse, especially w ith regards to its
definitional elasticity and the frequency with whi ch it appears in support of various causes without a system atic defense of its meaning or
moral val idity.8

contexts in whi ch th e President uses the term also vary widely. Those contexts includ e: national security, sexual assault awa ren ess, regu latory impact ana lys is, health
care, torture, human rights, the rights of wo men and girls, the death of Osama Bin
Laden, economic growth, economi c all iances, environmenta l initiatives, dip lo macy,
foreign independence mo vements, co mbating sex tra ffi ckin g, th e Nati ona l Day of
Prayer, and economic sa nctions, amon g others.
Perhaps even more interestin g than th is topi cal di vers ity arc th e diffe rent fo rms that
h uman dignity takes within the same speech. For exa mp le, iri prepared remarks to
honor the awarding of th e Nobel Peace Prize to Lu i Xiaobo, a Chinese human rig hts
activist and pol itical pri so ner, Pres ident Obama states just arrcr th e introdu ction, "A ll
ofus have a responsibil ity to bui ld a j ust peace that recogni zes the inherent rights and
dign ity of human beings a truth upheld within th e Uni versal D eclara tion of Human
Ri ghts" (my emphas is). He th en declares, a few lines later, " [Mr. ] Liu reminds us that
human di gnity also depend1· upon the advance of democracy, o pen society, and the
ru le of law" (See Barak Ohama, "Statement by Pres ident on the Awa rdin g of Nobe l
Peace Prize," www.Whitehouse.Gov/the- press-officc/20 I 0/ 12/ l 0/statcmcnt-president-awarding-nobel-peacc-prize, my emp has is) .
On the one hand, th ese sound like boiler-plate, non-co ntro vers ial claims for this kind
of context, at least to an American audi ence. O n the oth er hand , they contradict each
other: if di gnity is inherent then it should not, conceptuall y, depend on anythin g. L ikewise, if di gnity depends on cc,tain social and political c ircu msta nces (or anyth ing
else), then it is not clear how it could be either inh erent or, fo r that matter, universal.
Th is is not, I believe, a ni t-p icky di stin ction : human dignity lies at th e co re of the
argument Presiden t Obama emp loys to hon or and defend Mr. Liu, and yet the two
uses of the term in the speech arc incompatible, at least without substanti al additional
elaboration. Th is kind of incompatibility, moreover, is not isolated to Pres ident
Obama's use of d ignity. Claiming th at human worth is both inh erent and in need of
protection/advancemcnt--without expla ining how these two characteri stics can coherently coexist is co mmon in contempora1y mora l discourse.
8
I will be drawing from Martha Nussbaum 's arti cle in Human Dignity and Bioethics,
"Human Dignity and Political Entitlement" for thi s essay. Several ot her essays in the
collection effecti vely frame and repl y to th e question of human di gni ty's definit ion
and source. However, none, in my view, adequatel y respond to w hat I take to be one
of human dign ity's fundamental qu estions: What, from a co nceptual perspective, is
th e condition for the possibil ity of defi ni ng di gnity as both uni versal and equal? In
other words: What is conceptually necessary in order fo r ''human d ignity" to coherently app ly to all human beings in equ al measure? My answer, as the essay w ill seek
to demonstrate, is that di gnity must be defined as " in vulnerabl e. " I believe it is thi s
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Yet notwithstanding this re lative ly small body of literature, and despite the ubiquity of the term " human di gni ty" in contemporary moral
di scourse, there remains a problemati c dea rth of phil osophi cal and theological work dedicated to systematica ll y dc f'ining and de fendin g di gnity 's full meaning. In parti cul ar, there remains a lack of clarity on
what unique human characteristi c, or characteristics, coul d coherentl y
account for di gnity's purported uni versality and equa lity. T he normati ve de fini tion of human di gnity thu s rema ins an open and press ing
issue. T heory needs to catch up w ith practice.
To thi s end , thi s article seeks to help lay the theoretical groundwork
for a normati ve definiti on o f human worth by, first, identifying the
conceptual parameters required to describe dignity as both l) uni versal
and 2) equal , and then, second , testing th ree substantive accounts of
di gnity- those present in the thought o f mora l philosopher Alan
Gew irth , politica l theori st Martha Nussbaum, and theologian St. Pope
John Paul IL- in li ght of those parameters. It is important to stress at
the outset that my goa l is not to identify whi ch concepti on of di gni ty
is " true" in the sense of rationally necessary or otherwise persuasively
demonstrable, though th at is, of course, an important goal. Rather, I
am seeking to establi sh w hi ch conception o f dignity is coherent within
the co nceptual para meters o f " uni versality" and "equali ty." And by
"coherent" I onl y mea n, in a minimal sense, not self-contradictory. It
would be incoherent, for exa mpl e, for a definiti on of dignity to affirm
"a ll human be ings sometimes have universall y equal worth depending
on th e ir soci o-hi stori cal circumstances." T he clai m contradi cts itself;
if something is uni versa l, it cannot depend on any set of circumstances
nor can it " sometimes" be the case. ln thi s instance, we would have
good reason to rej ect such a view o f di gnity on the grounds of its inconsistency.
However, to rul e out a pa rti cul ar view of digni ty in this way does
not tell us what constitutes the right or true view of di gnity . In thi s
sense, the arti cle onl y seeks to test the intern al coherence of three different views o f di gnity, not to estab lish whi ch, if any, is true. Put differently, I am seekin g to identify a valid argument fo r the theoretical

conceptual requirement of in vuln era bi lity th at co nt emporary phil osoph ica l and th eologica l accounts of human di gni ty, in cludin g th e other texts listed above, ha ve either
overl ooked or undcrapprcciatcd - a lacun a, I beli eve, th at has led to substantia l confu sio n w ith rega rd s to di g ni ty ' s defin iti o n and ethi ca l implicatio ns. Sec Edmund Pe llegr ino, /\damn Schulman, and Tho mas Merril , eds. l-li1111a11 Dig nity and Bioethics
(Notre Dame: Uni versity of Notre Dame Press, 2009), G il bert Meil aendcr, Ne ither
Beas t Nor God: Th e Dign ity of the Hum an Person (New Yo rk : New Atl anti s Books,
2009), and George Kaleb, Hum an Dignity (Ca mbrid ge: 1larvard U ni vers ity Press,
2011 ).
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foundations of universal and equal dignity, not, necessarily, a sound
one. 9
Given these preliminary parameters, I wish to advance the following argument: if we seek to define human dignity as universally equal
among all human beings, then any account of human dignity that defines human worth according to human capacities must be understood
as incoherent. The "if' here is crucial. I am not arguing that we ought
to define human dignity as universally eq ual in this context or that
definitions of dignity that arc not universall y equal arc necessarily internally incoherent. l am, rather, deliberately assuming a starting
premise, sidestepping the foundational question of its justification.
The premise is that human dignity, whatever else it might be or entail,
is both universal and equal among all beings whom we otherwise define as "human ." 10 lf we accept this claim, I argue, then we arc com-

9

ln a basic sense, a va lid argument is one in which the conclus ion necessa ri ly follows
from the premises. /1. sound argu ment is val id, w ith the added criteri on that the premises are a lso true. Take for exam ple, the fol lowi ng argument: premise I) a ll human
beings have ~o.ua l dignity; premise 2) equal dignity bestows human eq ual rights on all
humans; premise 3) basic education is a human right; premise 4) Julia is a human
being; therefore, the conclus ion : Juli a has a right to basic education. This is a va lid
argument; given the premises, we have no other option bu t to co nc lude that Julia has
a right to basic ed ucation. To conc lude otherwise wou ld be, in a decis ive sense, incoherent and, hence, irrational.
However, is the argument also sound in addition to being va lid? That wou ld depend
on demonstrating the truth of each one of the premi ses, a n immensely comp lex ta sk
that wou ld include do ing foundat ional wo rk in both ethi cs and meta-ethics (that is,
not only identifying fou ndationa l moral principles but also establishin g the ulti mate
origin of those principles and how, cpistcmo logica ll y, they can be known). This arti c le
docs try to do this kind of work . Thus, in claim ing that I seek to establi sh a va li d rather
than sound argument for universa lly eq ual dign ity, I am c la iming that I will deliberate ly not seek to determine the truth of premise "human beings have universa ll y equa l
dignity. " 1 on ly seek, rather, to determine the va lid concl usion that must follow, assuming this premise as a sta rting point.
10
Insofar as thi s article seeks to establish the formal , conceptua l ground s for defining
dignity as universally equal, 1 do not seek to provide a specific, substantive definition
of what normatively constitutes a human being. In ot her words, I am not seeking to
substantively answer the quest io n "what is a human'>" eit her descripti vely or normatively in this context.
That said, it is difficu lt to concept uali ze human dignity as being uni versal and eq ual
if it only applies to a subset of humanity. Ind eed, if human d ignity only app lies to
some human beings, or app lies to all human beings but unequa ll y, then it is, by defini tion, not universal and/or equal. The quest ion wou ld therefore be: what do we call
those "entities" that are not human (or fo lly human) but a lso, apparent ly, not anyth ing
e lse in existence? Can so mething be both not (fu lly) human and not (ful ly) anything
e lse? The logical principle of identity appears to preclude thi s c laim. Thus, from a
descriptive standpoint, at least, it seems necessa rily to be th e case that so mething is
either uniquely a human or not unique ly a human, and one of the rnain points this
artic le is seeking to advance is that if human dignity is universally equa l, th en, by
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mittcd to rejecting all accounts of human dignity that find their justificatory warrant in some form of human capacities, which includes the
accounts of both Alan Gcwirth and Martha Nu ssbaum. 11
ln light of th is argument, 1 wil l conclude by argu ing that John Paul
H's theistic account of dignity can coherently support the claim that
dignity is universall y equal because it is grounded in a divine-human
re lationship, a relationship that recognizes the va lue of human capacities yet is not dependent upon them .
GEWIRTH AND NUSSBAUM: DIGNITY BASED ON HUMAN DOING

Before establishing and defend ing what co nstitutes "universal ity"
and "equality" as they app ly to a general conception of human dignity,
it is important to identify and expos it the specific accounts of dignity
in A lan Gcw irth and Martha Nussbaum, letting them speak for themselves, as it were, before I seek to impose a conceptual framework on
their thought. The reason r have chosen to engage Gcw irth and Nussbaum in particular is because each represents a conception of human
worth that finds its grounding in a human capacity or set of capacities:
"agency," as we wi ll sec in Gewirth, and "capabilities" in Nussbaum .
Let me first turn to Gew irth.

Gewirth, Human Agency, and the Supreme Principle of Morality
Gcw irth lays out hi s systematic case for human dignity in his book,
Reason and Morality ( 1978), though he also provides a condensed restatement of hi s position in a later work, Th e Community of Rights
( I 996). [ derive my own treatment of Gewirth 's argument for dignity
ch iefly, though not exclusively, from the latter work, desp ite the fact
that he develops his position more extensively in the former. The reason is that Gewirth ' s basic argument can, as he demonstrates in the
first chapter of Th e Community of Rights, be summarized concisely
without sacrificing the argument's force and cogency.
The first step in Gcwirth 's argument requires him to establish and
defend what he describes as an "agent." Gcwirth argues that whatever
we mean by action, we must at least mean that which is the object of
definition, a ll that w h ich is uniquely human mu st fri ll under the umbre ll a of that
wo rth otherw ise we are using the term ;.human dignil y" inco herentl y.
11 W hile ne ither Nussbaum nor Gew irth explicitli1 c laim th ey arc seeking to establish
a un iversa ll y equa l definiti on of human dignity, their respect ive arguments certain ly
imply tha t the ir use of't he words " human" o r ''person" mora ll y include as many individua ls as possib le under the umbrel la of eq ua l human worth all of those w ith "human capac it ies" fo r Nu ssbaum and a ll of those w ith "aut onomy," o r the potential fo r
autonomy, for Gcw irth. ln thi s sense, eac h is implicitly sugges ting that they view lrnman worth as both un iversa l and equa l. O n th ese gro unds, I beli eve ·'un iversa l equa lity" can serve as a fi xed conceptual sta nd ard for evaluati ng th e intern al co herence of
thei r respective mora l theori es.
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all practical precepts, whether they arc moral precepts or not- that is,
whether the precepts apply to what one ought categorically do independently of one's interests (moral precepts) or what one ought do in
order to pursue one's interests (prudential precepts). Y ct any precept,
he argues- that is, any statement that is made with the intention of
guiding action- necessarily implies that the object of the precept, the
person to whom the precept is addressed, is both I ) voluntary and 2)
purposive. In other words, any practical precept, qua precept, necessarily implies that the object of the precept is both free (voluntary) and
capable of acting for an end or goal (purposive). Gcwirth also calls
these two foundational characteristics the "generic foaturcs of action."
The term "agent" thus applies to individuals who act voluntarily and
with purpose.
Having defined agency, Gewirth then seeks to demonstrate how
acting as an agent necessari ly implies the existence and recognition of
a supreme principal of mora lity, which includes within it both the existence of each agent's fundamental dignity and the existence of basic
negative and positive rights based on that dignity. This conception of
dignity and human rights is " necessary" for Gcwirth , in the sense of
being rationally necessary. As he ex plains, "Any agent, s imply by virtue of being an agent, must admit, on pain of sci f-contradiction, that
he ought to act in certain determinate ways. " 12 These "certain determinate ways" reflect the existence and mora l authority of the supreme
principle of morality.
The movement from agency to the supreme principle of morality,
or, to put it differently, the movement from the "is" of the agent to the
"ought" that governs her action, takes place by a process of reasoning
Gcwirth calls "dialectical necessity. " Put simply, dialectical necessity
means establishing what any agent, qua agent, must necessarily affirm
in performing any action at all. By means of this necessity, Gcw irth
seeks to establish what he calls "two theses," which, together, constitute the supreme principle of morality and the justification for human
dignity. In his own words:
The first thesis is that every agent logi ca ll y must accept that he or she
has rights to freedom and well-being. The second is that the agent logically must also accept that all other agents also have these rights
equally with his or her own, so that in thi s way the existence of universa l moral rights, and thus of human ri ghts, must be accepted w ith in
the whole context of action and practiee. 13

12

Alan Gcwirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: Un iversi ty ofChieago Press, 1978),
26.
13
Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 17, author' s emphasis.
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These two theses ultimate ly entail the conclusion, for Gcwirth, that
human beings have rights by virtue of their agency. Any c laim to the
contrary is to engage in pragmatic self-contradiction .

Agency and Human Dignity
A lthoug h Gcwirth rarely uses the term " di gnity," he makes it c lear
that the supreme principle of mora lity that he derives from the agcntial
structure of human action is tantamount to a supreme principle of dignity, a point he makes explicit when he recasts his entire argument in
terms of human worth . The passage is worth citi ng at length:
[A]ll age nts attribute va lue o r wo rth to the purposes for w hich they
act. But since the age nts arc the so urces or loc i of th is att ribution o f
wo rth, they must a lso attribute wo rth to themselves . T heir purposes
arc conceived as hav ing worth or va lue beca use the agents themselves
have wo rth . T his attribution o f wo rth to the agents enco mpasses not
on ly thei r purposiveness as such but also the abilit ies of reason and
w il l that enter into their age ncy. For ac ting for purposes agents use
both w il l and reason: w ill in their freedo m as cont ro ll ing their behavior by their unforced cho ice and in their endeavors to ac hi eve their
purposes; reason in ascerta inin g the means to their ends, in attributing
to themselves rights to the necessary co nditions of their age ncy and
in accepting that all other age nts also have these rights. Even if they
reaso n incorrectly or will what is wrong, each agent must recogni ze
in herself and others the general abilities that g ive worth to human life
and action and that ground her attribution oft he rights of age ncy . Human d ignity co ns ists in hav in g and at least potent iall y using these abi lities, and huma n ri ghts arc derived from h uman d ign ity thu s conce ived. 14

T he passage reveal s the deep interp lay of agency- and in particular,
agcntial action- and human wo rth in Gcwi rth 's thought. To be an
agent is to have worth , and to have worth means tha t one is an agent,
or, at least, a prospective agent. More specifica ll y, it appears that both
reason and w ill- th e capacities that underpin an agent's more genera l
capacity to act vo luntari ly and w ith purposiveness- arc that which ultimate ly bestow value on human beings. In other words, human beings
have va lue because we arc agents or prospective agents; but we arc
agents or prospective agents only because we have, or w ill have, the
capacities of " reason" and "wil l." In thi s sense, th en, agency broadly,
and reason and will more specifica ll y, arc, in e ffect, the cause of human dignity; they arc those characteri sti cs that justify why human beings not only have worth , but a lso uniquely human worth.

14

Gcwirth, Reason and Morality, 66 , emph asis add ed.
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Nussbaum and the Dignity of Human Capacities
Martha Nussbaum takes a more comprehensive approach to defining human di gn ity. While she, like Gcwirth , upholds the fundamental
importance of agency as the ground of human worth- especially
agency as it rel ates to the human capac ity for rationality- she cautions
against defining worth exclusively on agency and rationality. She
writes in a recent essay, "Human Dign ity and Political Entitlements,"
for example, " [It] is quite crucial not to base the ascription o[ human
dignity on any single ' basic capability' (rationality, for example),
since this excludes from human dignity many human beings with severe mental disabilities." 15
Rationality and the capacity for agcntia l action thus form on ly one
component of Nussbaum' s conception of dignity . Her full account of
human worth includes several other "basic capabilities," as she calls
them, and it is these capabilities, in turn , that provide the justification
of her conception of human worth: "[F]ull and equal human dignity,"
she writes, "is possessed by any chi ld of human parents who has any
of an open-ended di sjunction of basic capabi lities for major human
lifc-activitics." 16 Indeed, she goes on to specify that human capacities
not only confer dignity on humans, but also, more fundamcntally,possess dignity themselves. The locus of human dignity, in other words,
is within human capacities. As she writes whi le describing how rape
violates dign ity, for example, "A woman ... has sentience, imagi nation,
emotions, and the capacity for reasoning and choice; to force sexual
intercourse on her is inappropriate, lacking in respect for the dignity
that those capacities possess." 17
The capacities of "sentience," imagination," "emotions," " reason ,"
and "choice" constitute only part of the list of central human capabilities. Others include li fe, bodily health, bodily integrity, affiliation
with others, non-discrimination, contact with other species, play, and
control over one's environment. 18 Taken together, it is thi s cluster of
human capacities for what Nussbaum calls "major human life activities" that account for how and why human beings have worth qua human beings.
It is important to note, as Nussbaum acknowledges, that this conception of dignity has deeply Aristotelian roots; to be human is not
only to be something ontological ly static- a human being- but also
to be something that develops, a "human becoming." And it is by
15
Martha Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements," in H11111a11 Dignity
and Bioethics, eds E. Pellegrino, A. Schulman , and T . Merrill (Notre Dame, IN: Un i-

vers ity of Not re Da me Press, 2009), 362.
16
N ussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements," 363 .
17
Nussbaum, " Human Digni ty and Political Ent itlements," 359, emph as is added.
18
Sec Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Po litical Entitlements," 377-8.
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means of exercising one 's basic human capac ities, she argues, that one
can and docs become fu lly human in the normative sense, a state of
ex istence she also ca ll s "human fl o urishing."
On thi s po int it is importa nt to stress, however, that Nussba um docs
not seek to identi fy a single sta ndard of normative humanity to which
all hu man li ves o ught to con fo rm . Herc she departs from Ari stoteli anism to em brace somet hing more ak in to Raw lsian libera lism; we ought
not seek to en force one vision o f the co mprehensive good, be it religious or secular, in any given pol iti cal commun ity. "[It] is itself violative of human dign ity," she argues, "to base political arrangements
on a single comprehensive doctrinc ." 19 Her emphasis on grounding
di gnity on human capacities thus fa lls on the possession and exercise
of the capacities themselves, not on what any given indiv idual uses
th em fo r. To be human and have worth, that is, is to have basic human
capac ities; to be a uni que person is to use those capacities to stri ve for
any morall y li cit goa l one chooses, insofa r as there is not one normati ve goa l that a ll humans ought to pursue. As she writes , " [H]uman
beings have a worth that is indeed inalienable, because of thei r capacities for vario us forms of acting and stri ving. " 20
Nussbaum's conception o f digni ty thus rests on a broader theoretical fo undation than Gcw irth's. Humans not on ly have dign ity beca use
we arc rational and purposive agents; we also have dign ity because we
have uni q ue capab ilities to beco me more hu man by exercising a broad
array of distinctively human capac ities . Eac h capacity is fund amenta ll y re lated to what it means to be human. Indeed , Nussbaum goes fa r
beyond a stri ctly agcntial account o f digni ty by add itiona lly recognizing a deep connection . between uniquely hu man needs and un iquely
human worth: "There is a digni ty not onl y in rationa li ty," she wri tes,
" but in human need itself and in the varied form s of' stri ving that
emerge fro m human nccd ." 21
T H E C ONDITI ON FOR T II E POSS IBI LITY OF UNIVERSAL EQUALITY

Notw ithstandin g the fundame nta l differences between Gcwirth and
Nussbaum , it is important to recogni ze that both ground their respecti ve concepti ons o f di gni ty on human capac iti es. To be human in a
moral sense is derived from human doing- or the potential to dorather than human being; w heth er it is human purposiveness and rati onality o r human strivin g more generall y, to have a capacity as it
relates to human di gnity, for both , is to have a power to do something
di stinctive ly human. Capaci ti es in thi s sense certain ly include rational
capacities and the capac ity fo r purposive acti on; yet they also include
19

Nussbaum, '" Human Dignit y and Po liti cal Entitlement s," 362.
Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitl ements," 357 .
21
Nussbaum, " I luman Dignity and Political Entitlement s," 363.
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the kinds of basic human capabiliti es that Nussbaum enumerates, capabilities that arc related to rationality and purposive action, but not
necessarily reducible to them. As Nussbaum in particular implies, human child ren have dignity-bearing capacities long before they develop
agency.
The question I wish to address, then, is whether these capacitygrounded views of human worth can coherently account for a definition of dignity that purports to be both universal and equal. As noted
above, l do not intend to examine or criticize the views of Gcwi rth or
Nussbaum per se, or, even, to question whether or not they can coherently ground some conception of dignity. Rather, 1 seek to test them
against a definition of dignity that affirms that di gn ity, whatever else
it may be, belongs to all human beings without exception in equal
measure. Can either Gcwirth or Nussbaum coherently account for this
kind of dignity?

Basic Definitions of" Universality" and "Equality"
As a starting point for making this eva luation, it is crucial to establish some basic meanin gs for both " universality" and "equality," and
then to ask what these terms conceptually entail. The common, everyday uses of these words do suffi cient work for the purposes of the argument. Describing something as "universal" means that it app lies to
every member of a given class or gro up, everywhere, all the time, with
no exceptions. Not admitting of exceptions is particularly important
for the conception of universality; if there is even one exception- that
is, if even one member of a particular group or class docs not share the
otherwise "un iversal" characteristic defining the group or class- then,
by definition , the characteristic cannot be described as universa l. So
to say "human dignity is universal" means that all humans have dignity everywhere, all the time; or, put again, of the class/group "human,"
all members uni versally have worth.
Given this definition, it wou ld thus be conceptually incoherent to
claim that "some humans have universal human di gnity" or "all humans have universal dignity in some places or sometimes," or "all human s have human dignity depending on .... " If dignity is universalconceptually independent of why or how it is uni versal- then it must,
in an absoluti st sense, somehow inhere in, or otherwise apply to, every
single human being without exception or the potenti al for an exception.
Otherwise human dignity is not, by definition , universa l.
Describing something as "equal," in turn , means claiming that it is
quantitatively and/or qualitati vely identical everywhere it ex ists. As
with universality, equality also has absolutist conceptual implications:
one cannot say coherently, for example, to paraphrase the famous line
from Animal Farm , "all humans have equa l di gnity but some have
more dignity than others." Conceptually, equality docs not admit of
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degrees; there can be no " more" or " less." So to say that human beings
have equ al w orth- aga in, independent o f why or how it is equal- is
to say that human beings have abso lu tely ident ica l worth, worth that
inheres in th e sa me way, to the sa me extent, in every individual who
has worth.
Combining the characteri sti cs of uni versa li ty and equa lity and applying them to a concepti on o f human dignity thus entail s the fo ll owing affirmati o n: every human being- that is, every indi vidua l being
otherw ise de fin ed as " human"- has worth in the same way and to the
sa me extent as every other human being. If worth docs not ex tend to
all human bein gs then it is not universa l. lf that worth admits o f any
kind o f degree, even if it is uni versal, it is not equa l. Uni versa lly equal
human di gnity, therefore, is an ex hausti ve, absolutist conception, at
least from a form a l, conceptua l perspecti ve . It all ows for no exclusions
and admits of no dcgrccs .22
lt is important to note, here, that uni versa lity and equality do not
necessaril y conceptua ll y imply each other. To say someth ing is universal , in other words, is not necessaril y to say that it is equa l; likewise,
to say something is equal, is not necessaril y to affi rm that it is uni versa l. One could, fo r exampl e, coherentl y profess a belie f that humans
with a certain kind of characteri stic or grou p of characteri stics have
equal di gnity, w hil e those who do not possess that characteristi c or
group of characteri sti cs do no t ha ve equal di gni ty. From such a perspecti ve di gnity would be de fin ed as equal, but not uni versa l.
A poignant exampl e of thi s claim ca n be fo und in Ari stotl e's Nicomachean Eth ics. T hough Ari stotle is often credited for making a
di stincti ve, ega litarian-tinted break with pre-Socrati c Greek thought
by examining the fun cti on or fin al cause of humans as such, independentl y of the ir socia l status and rol e in the pol is (sec, e.g., I 097b,
2 1-27), he clearl y catego rizes a large swath o f huma nity as e ffect ively
non-human in a mo ral sense. Take, fo r exampl e, thi s passage often
overl ooked or dow npl ayed by contemporary admirers of Ari stotle 's
thought:
[A nyo ne] who is go ing to be a co mpetent student in the spheres of
what is noble a nd what is just- in a word, po liti cs must be brought
22

1 do not mea n to claim, eve n fro m a fo rma l perspecti ve, th at uni versall y eq ua l worth
implies that a ll human bein gs mu st a ll be treated equal ly, o nl y th at they woul d have
to be shown eq ua l moral regard T hi s di stincti o n between equa l trea tment and equal
rega rd substanti ve ly and persuasive ly develo ped, fo r examp le, in Ge ne Outka 's
boo k Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Ya le University Press, 1972) - is especially impo rt ant fo r answerin g the quest io n of how to apply a uni versall y equ al
co ncept ion of human worth . O ne ca n eas il y imagi ne showi ng equ a l moral rega rd to a
fi ve year o ld and an e ight een year old, fo r exa mp le; but o ne hopes they wou ld not be
treated th e same.

50

Matthew Petrusek
up well in its habits. For the first principle is the belief that something
is the case, and if this is sufficiently clear, he wi ll not need the reason
why as well. Such a person is in the possess ion of the first princip les,
or could easily grasp them. Anyone with neither of these poss ibilities
open to him should listen to [the poet] Hes iod:
This person who understands everything for himself is the
best of a ll ,
And noble is that one who heeds good adv ice.
But he who neither understands it for himsel r nor takes to
heart
What he hears is a worthless man .23

Aristotle 's claim about the potential value of a human being in this
passage is not subtle. His claims for cqual.ity arc hardly universal.
Aristotle essentially declares that any individual who has " not been
brought up well" in "good habits"- which, means, we should be clear,
those children not fortunate enough to have been born into the right
kinds of households in the right kinds of civic environment- will inevitably not become virtuous, and thus inevitably fail to fulfill their
proper function as a human being, which, according to Aristotle, renders them, borrowing Hesiod ' s words, "worthless." In other words,
there are humans in Ari stotle' s world who, despite being classified as
human (and therefore not classified as any other kind of animal), have
no intrinsic moral worth at all. They may look like humans, act (in a
non -moral sense) like humans, and communicate like humans, but
they arc not morally humans because they cannot realize their final
cause or proper function: a life of virtue in service of the polis and in
contemplation of the Unmoved Mover.
This exclusion of a large swath of humanity from moral recognition docs not, however, prevent Aristotle from recognizing substantive
moral equality among those who do have the good fortune to have
been born and raised in a properly formed city-state. Indeed, in a way
that might make him arguably more " egal itarian" than Plato, he even
recognizes a kind of equal ity of opportun ity to become authentically
virtuous, and thus happy in the eudainomisti c sense, among those who
have been rightly habituated in the polis: " I.For] all who arc not
maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue," he writes in the Ethics,
" may win it by a certain kind of study and care. " 24 Everyone, in other
words, has a relatively equal chance to become virtuous and thus fully
23

Ari stotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Cri sp (Cambridge: Cambrid ge Uni versity Press, 200), I 095b, 4-10. The qu otation from Hesiod is found in Hesiod: The
Works and Days, trans. Ri chmond Lattimore (Ann Arbor: Uni versity of M ich igan
Press, 1959), 293 , 295-7 .
24
Aristotl e, Nicomachean Ethics, I 099b, 19-20.
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human- so long as we understand "everybody" as those formed in
good habits. So wh il e Socrates stand s starkl y isolated after explaining
to his interlocutors how to ascend to the Form of the Good at the end
of The Symposium , Aristotle dep icts a cornrnzmity of the virtuous in
the polis, going so far as to locate friend ship, which is only possible
among equals in his view, as essentia l to fu lfillin g one's final human
purpose. Humans, therefore, can certainly be understood as morall y
equal to Aristotle, but not uni versally so. It is an example of how
equality docs not necessaril y presuppose uni versality .
T he opposite also holds true: un iversality docs not necessarily entail full cquality. 25 One could maintain, for example, that all humans,
by virtue of being human , have some kind of objective worth that mora ll y distinguishes us from all other forms of life. But that claim docs
not necessari ly commit one to claiming that all humans have substantively equal worth . For instance, one could beli eve that all humans, no
matter what their measurable level of intelligence, have some kind of
basic dign ity, but add that those who have IQ scores of at least I 00, or
those who come from a particular blood li ne, or those who share certa in physical feature s have more dignity by virtue of belonging to an
"enhanced" subset of humanity, which, the argument could then be
made, entitles them to additional or enhanced rights and protections.
It is one thing to say that everyone gets a sli ce of the pie, another to
say that every slice mu st be the same size. It is for thi s reason, then ,
that my argument's starting po int is the claim that dignity is un iversal
and equal. The attribution of equality to un iversality is not redu ndant.

Universal Equality and In vulnerability
If, then, human d ign ity is both universa l and eq ual, as I am assuming, what, then , also must be true about dignity so-defined from a
purely conceptual perspective? The condition for the poss ib ility of
universal equality, I bel ieve, takes the form of "invulnerability," and,
specifical ly, invulnerabi li ty to harm (includ ing ulti mate harm or extirpation) and/o r enhancement.
As with un iversa lity and equali ty , a basic understanding of the term
"invulnerability" adequately ill um inates the necessary point in th is
context. To say something is invu lnerab le is, dra wing on the word' s
Latin roots, to say that it cannot be harmed or wounded. That is, the
integrity and unity of that which is invulnerable can not be qua litatively
or quantitative ly extirpated, effaced, or dimini shed in any way. The
"cannot" here docs not mean that one cannot intend or t, y to cause
25 Uni versali ty docs concept1ia ll y imp ly some measure or equ ality insofar as it is the
case that if human worth is uni versa l then every human must have at least so me
va lue . b ut that docs not mea n that everyone nrnst have .rnbstcmtive~)' equa l va lue
so lely by virtue of bein g huma n.
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harm to that which is invulnerable; rather, it app lies to the efficacy of
such an act: if something is invulnerable one cannot effectively cause
harm to it. lt is for thi s reason, too, that invulnerability also, according
to the Oxford English Dictionary, means " unassa ilable;" that which is
unassailable is that which cannotsucces:c,jully be attacked. Conversely,
if somethi ng can be effectively assai led, and thus harmed or diminished in some way, it is not, by definition, in- vu lnerable.
What, then , docs "invu lnerability" mean when describing a conception of human worth, and why is it a necessary presupposition for
uni versality and equality? Put simply, if dignity is not conceived of as
invulnerable, then it cannot coherently be described as either universal
or equal. Imagine, for example, a horrifying action or event that, we
might say, causes severe or, even, irrevocable harm to those who experience it. Examples representing both "moral" and " natural " evi ls
are, sadly, not difficult to think of: rape, torture, drug-addiction, incapacitating poverty, di sfiguring di sease, injuries that leave victims conscious but otherwise completely immobile, mental illness and the loss
of one's personality, etc. It goes w ithout saying that these kinds of
experiences deeply wound individuals, perhaps even causing, in extreme cases, the loss of the person 's individuality in the sense of those
unique characteristics that define a human as a specific person. But do
they cause individuals to lose thei r individua l dignity'? If so- again,
purely from a conceptual perspective- we cannot therefore say that
human dignity is universa l. Recognizing the potenti al loss of dignity,
for whatever reason, is to recognize poss ibl e exceptions to the universality of human worth and, therefore, to contradict the possibility and
coherence of universality itself. ffdignity can be eradicated or defaced
in any way for whatever reason, in other words, then it is not something that can inhere in or apply to every human being w ithout exception. It is, rather, something that is conditional, something w hose integrity and unity depends on whether or not it is respected or violated
by one's own actions, the actions of others, and/or good or bad fortun e. 26 "Universality," however, cannot coherently accommodate

26

Ari stotle ' s thought, as noted above, ca nnot provide a cohcrcnl foundat ion for universa lly equa l human worth (a conclusion that Ari stotl e wou ld mostl y likely not find
problematic), but hi s conception of the normative human be ing and what defines human flouri shing is, neverthe less, deep ly insightful for und erstandin g the di stinction
between vulnerab ili ty and invulnerability in this contex t. Wh il e Ari stotle recogni zes
the possibility of li vi ng a fully-human li fe by cult ivating bo th mora l and intellectual
virtue in service of the po lis and/or in contemplation o f the Unmoved Mover, he is
clear that achieving such a life not on ly depends on being born into th e right k ind of
community so that one can acquire, by absorption , the good hab its necessary for moral
virtue in particular, it a lso depends on what the philosopher Thomas Nage l would call
"moral luck" (sec Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck," in Eth ics: /-fisto, y, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, eds. S. Cahn and P. Markie [New York: Oxfo rd University Press,
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"condi tiona lity," and so if dign ity is conditi ona l,Jor whatever reason,
it is not uni versal. The onl y way to say that dignity is universal , therefore , is to say that it is invulnerable to any attempt to stri p or efface it,
whether th e attempt comes fro m human hand s, natura l disaster, or the
bad luck o f th e geneti c d raw .
A similar arg ument can be made w ith rega rds to the relati onship
between in vulnerabili ty and equ a lity. Equ ali ty, reca ll , docs not conceptuall y a llow for degrees; to say that something has more or less of
a given quality than other entiti es with the same quality is to say, by
definiti on, that it is unequa l. T hu s, if there is a kind of event, action,
or environment that has the ca pac ity to quanti tatively or qualitati ve ly
diminish human worth in any way- no matter how much or to what
extent- then we cannot say co herently that di gn ity is equal. The same
goes fo r any event, action, or environment that has the capacity to
quanti tati vely o r qua!itati vc ly augment o r improve human worth, as
we ll: i/ such a poss ibili ty ex ists, then di gni ty is not equal. Independentl y of how we de line the o ri gins and content of worth , in other
words, to allow the possibili ty of any degree or gradation o f di gnity is
to render it unequal. T hus, as w ith uni versali ty , the on ly way to say
that di gnity is equal is to say that it is invulnerable- invu lnerable, in
parti cular, to any kind o f in terna l or externa l power that would have
the capacity to destroy, degrade, or improve it.
It is fo r these reasons, therefore, th at invulnerabi li ty is a necessary
preconditi on for the claim that " di gni ty is uni versall y equa l in all human beings." ff thi s claim is true about di gni ty, then the claim " human
di gnity is in vulnerabl e" must also be tru e. Otherw ise, we arc committed to recogni zing that human worth is somehow vulnerable; and if it
is vulnerable, in any way for whatever reason, it is conceptually possibl e to eradi cate and/or weaken (or strengthen) it, and, consequently,
conceptuall y impossible to ca ll it " uni versal" or "cqual."27

2009], 752-6 1). Aristotle specifi cs tha t developing the virtues must take place "over
a full li fe" in order fo r human li fe to fl ouri sh; if di saster strikes along the way say a
debilitating loss of a loved one, or a traumati c injury, or th e emotional devastation or
wrongly being accused o f a crime the humans of good hab its may ultimately fa ll
short of their potenti al, and thus fai l to be Ii.i ll y human, by, in effect , no fau lt of their
own. It is instructi ve to compare this concepti on of 1110m l vulnerabili ty with the impli cit moral invuln erability fo und in Socrates's fa mous dec laration before being put
to death : '' Wherefore, 0 judges, be of good cheer about deat h, and know this of a
truth that no evil can happen to a good ma n."
27 It is importa nt to note that "h uman di gni ty" and " human life" may be deeply interrelated, but the fo rmer cannot be reducib le to the latter if dignity is to be understood
as un iversal and equal. Lile, of course, not onl y can be lost, it can also exist in degrees
in terms of greater or lesser bio logica l fu nct ioning in re lati on to the standard of hea lthy
fun ctioning. So while human di gni ty may include human li fe, it cannot be reducible
to it if aga in, di gnity is un iversally equa l.
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Is Any Human Capacity Invulnerable?
Thi s brief foray into abstract conceptua l territory leads us back to
the substantive central question, namely, whether either Gcwirth or
Nussbaum can coherently account for universally equal dignity. And
it appears we arc arriving at an answer: if, indeed, invulnerability, as
this article has defined it, is a necessary condition for universality and
equality, then it appears to be the case that no human capacity, or set
of capacities, can coherently serve as the ground for a definition of
universally equal dignity. In order to support the opposite conclusion-namel y, that capacities could provide such a justification-we
would have to identify at least one human capacity that is in vu lnerable
to all attempts to harm and/or enhance it. Can we?
Gcwirth and Nussbaum provide helpful test cases. Gcwirth, as
noted above, founds his account of dignity on agency, which, in turn ,
he grounds in two characteristics of human action: I) vo luntariness or
freedom, and 2) purposiveness or intentionality, which includes rationality (one must be able to know what one is acting for in order to
be an agent). lf a human being docs not have these capacities, then a
human is not an agent; and, by Gcwirth's own reasoning, if a human
is not an agent, then she or he docs not have human worth.
Gewirth recognizes the morally troubling nature of this claim, and
so adds what he calls "prospective agents" to the protective umbrella
of human worth. By prospective agents, he primarily means chi ldren,
who arc not yet agents- because they do not yet have fu ll y developed
free will or rationality- but who one day will be agents. Setting aside
the problematic derivation of prospective agency as grounds for moral
worth (prospective agency is not part or the dialectically necessary
structure of human action, and therefore it is not clear how, on rationa l
grounds, the supreme principle of morality can apply to children), it is
important to ask whether agency, either in its actualized or potential
form, is in vu lnerable to harm and/or enhancement.
The question, r think, answers itself. Agency is not only something
that can and docs exist in degrees in the sense of some humans having
more agency than others; think, for example, of ch ildren who arc in
the process of becoming full agents and foll agents who arc in the process of becoming diminished agents because of age, disease, or injury.
Agency, it appears, can also be completely destroyed. We need not
only think of the exceptionally difficult moral cases of indi vidual s who
arc alive but in a coma; individuals who have acute mental diseases,
or who have been tortured, or who have been severely emotionally
abused-they, too, can utterly lose their agency as Gcw irth defines it.
Some individuals who suffer such disease and trauma may be able to
regain their agency. But some won't. There arc many classes of individuals whom we otherwise define as human , in other words, who arc
not, and never will be, "agents" in Gcwirth 's sense.
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Again, my goa l here is not to critique Gcwi rth 's view of human
dignity in and of itself, but, rather, to demonstrate that hi s account of
agency, founded on the capacities of freedom and rationality, cannot
coherently account for universally equal di gni ty . Agency is deeply
vu ln erable to harm and/or enhancement, and can and docs exist in degrees. And insofar as it is vu lnerable in thi s way, as I sought to establish above, we cannot coherently say a conception of human dignity
founded on agency is uni versa ll y equal. To be sure, Gcwirth may be
able to justify some conception of dignity- perhaps we might ca ll it
"personal dignity" -but he cannot coherently justify uni versally equal
human dignity.
The same conclusion app li es to Nussbaum ' s account of human
worth . To be sure, Nussbaum seeks to ground digni ty on more than
agency. However, even if we broaden the scope o f capacities eligible
for justifying human worth, we arc still foundin g it on capacities:
sense, imagination , friendship, play, contact w ith nature, even having
bodily integrity- these arc things that human beings do or can potentially do. And insofar as they arc things that we do, it is not only the
case that some humans, even in potential form , can do them better or
more effectively than others, which is to recognize, prima faci e, that
human capacities arc profoundly unequal. It is also to recognize that
these capacities can, put simply, be taken away. lndecd, it is in great
part for thi s reason that Nussbaum highlights the moral importance of
these capacities; she wants individuals and communiti es to protect
them and help them to flouri sh. However, the very recognition of the
vu lnerabi lity of capacities, and , hence, the need to safeguard them,
necessari ly leads to the conclusion that these capacities arc neither
universal nor equal and , therefore , cannot coherentl y ground a universal ly equal conception of dignity.
The more radical formulat ion of this claim goes beyond Nussbaum
and Gcw irth. It app li es to all human capacities, however we might define them. The more basic claim is that no human capacity is unassailab le. That is, there arc no human capacities that do not in some way
depend on any number of internal (an individual 's ow n actions) or external ( one' s own genetics, the actions of others, th e nature of one 's
surrounding environment) conditions for their in itial existence, continued existence, and/or the degree to which they e ffectively operate
for any particu lar purpose. If thi s claim accurately characterizes all
human capacities, then al l human capacities arc vulnerab le and, therefore , no human capacity is invulnerable. As such, no capacity can account for a universally equal , which, is to say, in vuln erable conception
of human worth. Put positively, any conception of universally equal
human dignity that seeks to justify its universal equality based on a
human capacity or set of human capacities is ncccssa ri ly incoherent.

56

Matth ew Petrusek

Human Capacities and the Problem of Human Dignity
Thi s, then, is one of the fundamental problems inhering with in the
conception of human dignity. If no human capacity can coherently
cause or otherwise warrant invulnerable human dignity, what else arc
we left with? What other " human someth in g" might be able to account
not on ly for how we arc distinctively valuab le, but also universally
and equa lly so? If nothing humans do can account for dignity, perhaps,
then , we can turn to what we biologically are. That is, perhaps human
DNA, something that inheres universally and equally among all human beings, could provide the grounds for universally equal human
worth .
The problem with this line of thinking is that even if DNA could
account for a conception of dignity as such , it is not c lear how it could
account for human dignity in particular. The claim would essentially
be that what makes human s valuable, the cause of our worth, is that
we arc all bio-chcmically the same as a species. But how, then , are we
morally different from any other species? How wou ld human dignity
be any different qualitative ly from the dignity of dolphin s, g uinea pigs,
mosquitos, or any specific kind of bacterium? If s hared DNA constitutes the standard by which we attribute dignity to something, in other
words, then all life, or at least every species of life, wou ld have equal
dignity, in which case the " human" in "human dignity" wou ld be supcrfluous.28
We cannot, moreover, claim that DN A is invulnerable g iven ongoing scientific "advancements" in genetic engineering . Human DNA
can be, and has been, altered, including attempts to combine it with
the DNA of non-human animal s. Whether s uch experimentation
should be permitted and, if it is permitted, in w hat ways and under
what conditions it should be allowed is a vital question. But the fact
that it can happen at all challenges the status of human DNA as something that could account for a universa ll y equal conception of human
dignity. Even if human DNA could never be annihilated save for some
28
In th is sense, human life is radi ca ll y simil ar to a ll oth er fo rms of biol ogica l li fe: we
arc contingent beings who come into material ex istence and leave mate rial ex istence
by forces we have minima l (and, ult imately, no) co ntrol over. We arc pa rt of the
"givcncss" of ex istence. In this respect, we arc not uniqu e, and, thu s, cannot claim any
moral di stincti veness on the grounds of thi · givcncss. To be sure, humans, or most
humans, can and do have a unique awaren ess of and response to this situation of
g ivcncss; to say th at we arc g iven is not to say that we do not have any freedom in
re lation to being given. Yet this freedom, and the awareness underlyin g it, describes
a capacity ; and any capacity or group o f capac iti es, as I so ught to argue above, cannot
coherently serve as the grou nds of uni versa ll y equa l di gnity. ln other words,
"givcncss" itself cannot acco unt for makes hum an di gnit y "human," and th e human
response to givencssness cannot account for what ma kes human di gnity universal and
equal. (I am indebted to Roberto Dell ' Oro fo r the co ncept ion of·'givcncss" as a constitutive fea ture of human existence.)
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catastrophic global event that eradicated all human life (in which case
the question of what warrants uni versall y equal human dignity wou ld
become moot), there is nothing intrinsic to the nature of DN A itself
that prevents it from being corrupted in the sense o f al tering its origi nal
integri ty. There is nothing, in other words, that conceptua lly or practically guarantees that all human s will , by virtue of their human ity,
remain equal in terms of our shared genetic structure. So in addition
to the problem of justifying how and why human DNA could generate
worth in general and human worth in particular, it seems that even the
very b lueprint of human life is not, ultimately, inv ulnerable and thus
not capable of accounting for a universally equa l account of human
worth.
The fundamental problem of human di gn ity, then , appears to be
thi s : In order to claim that human di gnity is uni versal and cqualwhich, aga in, is to claim that every be ing otherwise defined as "human" has equal worth qua human- we cannot appea l to anyth ing that
is in human beings or of'human beings qua humans, inc luding all human capacities, in order to justify that worth . Thi s is doubly a problem
because, as Gewirth and Nussbaum effectively illustrate, to be human
from a moral perspective is, in a dec isive sense, to possess and employ
di stinctive ly human capacities like freedom , and purposiveness, and
imagi nation , and friendship. How could we conceive of human beings
as valuab le without reference to these kinds o f' capacities?
JOHN PAUL ll 'S THEI STI C CONCEPTION OF DIGNITY
AS A POSS IBLE SOLUTION

The question , in other words, becomes whether it is possible to coherently conceive of human dignity as universally equal in a way that
recogn izes the va lue of human capaciti es yet is not ultimate ly dependent upon those capacities. There is at least one way, I believe, and it
takes the form of a thei stic conception o r dignity, like, for examp le,
that w hich we sec in the thought of Pope John Paul IL
As a preliminary po int, I wish to emphas ize that l mean " theism"
in its most basic and widely-accepted sense for the purposes of the
argument in thi s context: namely, the affirmati on of the existence of a
transcendent and personal d ivine being. The qualiti es of " transcendence" and " persona l" arc both important here. To say that a being is
transcendent is to say that it ex ists independently of everything else in
ex istence, to say, that is, that it docs not depend ontologically on any
other being. In thi s sense, a transcendent being is a lso, by defin ition, a
non-contingent being, and insofar as it is non -co ntingent, it is, there-
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fore, also ontologically invulnerable to everything in existence-nothing in existence, in other words, has the capacity to eradicate, diminish, or enhance its existence. 29
Yet this kind of ontological independence and invulnerability docs
not mean that a transcendent being cannot be in re lation with that
which is non-transcendent. It is not a definitional contradiction, in
other words, for theism to claim that the transcendent being is also a
personal being. As transcendent and, thus, ontologically independent,
the divine docs not need to be in relationship with non-contingent reality, including human beings; yet thei sm claims that the divine noncontingent being chooses to be in this kind of relationship. In this way,
then , theism can affirm that the non-contingent and contingent-the
divine and the human, in this context-can and do have a relationship.
Pope John Paul JI presents this kind of theistic view of God-inrelation throughout his theological writings, but especially in his encyclical , Evangelium vitae (The Gospel ofLife). The text commences
with an affirmation that life, in its fu llest sense, means eternal life in
communion with the divine: "Man is called to a fullness of life," John
Paul writes, " which far exceeds the dimensions of hi s earth ly existence,
because it consists in sharing the very life of God." 30 Yet he quickly
and carefully qualifies thi s assertion by c larifying that humankind's
final goal of communion with God docs not diminish the value of temporal life. To the contrary, it is the very call to communion with the
divine that endows temporal life with its worth and s ignificance. As
he writes, "The loftiness of thi s supernatural vocation reveals the
greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal
phase. Life in time ... is the fundamental condition, the initial stage
and an integral part of the entire unified process of human cxistcncc."3 1
This synthetic relationship between the transcendent and the temporal plays a crucial role in defining John Paul 's conception of dignity.
On the one hand, he seeks to ground the worth of the person in the
individual' s supernatural origin and destiny; human beings, he argues,
29

It is important to note here that to say the divine is in vulnerable to the created world
(including human action) is not to say that the created world , espec ia lly incl uding
human action, can or docs not affect th e divine. Indeed, from with in the thought of
John Paul II specifically, and many strands of C hristian thought more broad ly, it matters profoundly to God whether or not human beings choose to accept God's invitation
to relationship and communion. God, in thi s sense docs not need, but God docs desire - in this case, God desires fellowship and it is meaning ful to the divine whether
or not human beings exercise their freedom to fulfi ll that desire (and, by doing so, to
fulfi ll their own humanity). In this sense, human action docs not '·harm" or "improve"
God from an ontological perspective, bu t it docs make a di)./erence to God .
JO John Paul II , Tl1e Go.1pe/ a/Life, (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1995), 12.
JI John Paul II , The Gospel of Life, 12.
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arc created in the image of' God and , though f'al lcn, redeemed by
Chri st's death and resurrection, wh ich enables huma ns to return to
God , our one and only true home. Indeed, th e very fact that God chose
to redeem humanity desp ite our sin by becoming human both establi shes and confirms the unparall e led value of' hu manity and of each
human life. As John Paul avers, "Trul y great must be the va lue of human Ii f'c if the Son of' God has taken it up and made it the instrument
o f the salvation of all humanity! " 32
Y ct John Paul also maintains that the process of returning to God,
of being justified and sa nctified, takes place in the concrete socia l and
hi stori cal circumstances that each ind ividua l occupies during her spcci fic lifetime. Dignity 's supernatural ori gin and destiny, in other
words, plays itself out in each indi vidual 's natural li fe. " [Life on
earth] ," he affirms, " remains a sacred reality entru sted to us, to be
preserved with a sense of responsibility and brought to perfecti on in
love and in the gift or ourselves to God and to our brothers and sisters." 33
In recogni zing these two poles of human ex istence, the natural and
the supernatural, The Gospel of'Li/e thus seeks to provide an account
of di gn ity that is both transcendent and temporal in such a way that
the transcendent- ou r ori gin in the divine and fin a l destiny as communion w ith the divine- acts as both the ground and goal of temporal
life. As John Paul expla ins, "The dignity ol'this life is linked not only
to its beginning, to the fact that it comes from God, but also to its fina l
end , to its destiny or fe ll ows hip w ith God in know ledge and love of
him ."34
Thi s "dual citi zenship" between natural and supernatura l existence
also helps ex plain Joh n Paul ' s conception or how the image of God
re lates to human dignity. Humans have dignity because we arc created
in God's image, w hi ch, fo r John Paul , means th at humans have capacities analogou s to God' s capacities, something th at is unique in Creation . As he wri tes, "The /(le w hi ch God offers to man is a g(fi. by which
God shares something ofhimse(/with his creature. "35 That whi ch God
shares with human beings not only includes stewa rdsh ip over Creation , but also, as he specifie s, " those spiritua l faculties whi ch arc di stinctive ly human, such as rea son, discernment between good and ev il,
and free will." 36 To be human , in other words, is to be able to know
the good as good and to be ab le to freely choose to act in accordance
w ith it. Humans arc unique in Creation, moreover, not only because
32

Jo hn
Jo hn
J. I John
35 Jo hn
36 Jo hn
33

Paul 11 ,
Paul 11 ,
Paul II ,
Paul II,
Pau l II ,

The Gospel of Li/e, 59, document 's emph as is.
The Gospel o/Lif e, 12, document's emph asis.
The Gospel Cl/Life, 65.
The Gospel of Life 60, document 's empha si ·.
The Gospel o/Li/e, 60.
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we possess these capacities, but also because we possess the potential
to employ them for their intended purposes: attaining virtue in thi s life
so that we may, by God's gracious gift, enj oy communion with God
in the next. The value human beings have by virtue of these capacities
associated with the image of God is thus attached both to ca pacities
themselves and for the ends for whic h they can and ought to be used.
John Paul is careful, however- and th is is crucial for the artic le's
overall argument- to avo id the conclusion that either the image of
God in humanity or the dignity associated with it is reducible to these
capacities. Indeed, one of the greatest themes in the encyc li cal is John
Paul 's lamentation that the contemporary world regards those w ith dimini shed capacities as having less value than other human beings. A s
he writes, "It is clear that .. . there is no place in the world for anyone
who, like the unborn or the dying, is a weak clement in the social structure, or for anyone who appears completely at the mercy o f others and
is rad ically dependent on them, and can on ly commu ni cate through
the silent language of a profound sharing of affcction. " 37 The recognition of human dignity thus enj oins all individual s to recognize that
every person has the same intrinsic worth as every other person, and
that to be "a person" is not only defined by what we can do, but also,
and more fundamentally , by who we are: indi vidua ls created in the
image of God and redeemed by Chri st 's li fe, death, and resurrection.
37

John Paul 11 , The Gospel o/Li/e, 36. The re lationship between the image of God as
being valu ab le independently of human capacities and th e image of God as bein g va luable because of human capacities is co mpl ex in John Paul II 's thought. On the surface, it may appear to be a contradi cti on how ca n he claim that human beings are
both va luable because they have d istinctivel y human capacities yet also deny that
those capacities confirm va lue on human li fe? W hil e a fu ll exposition of this c lement
of John Paul 's conception of dignity fall s o uts ide the scope of th is artic le, it is importa nt to note that th is need not ncccssar i ly be interpreted as a cont rad icti on i f we
understand the image of God not on ly as an onto logica l constitut ive feat ure of who
human beings arc, but a lso as a potential to be realized. Insofar as the image of God
ontologically defin es human s as di gn ifi ed , it docs so independen tl y o f any ca pac ity or
the exercise of that capacity; in sofar, however, as the image of God defines d ign ity as
a potential to be reali zed (so, for examp le, one ca n become more fu lly human from a
mora l standpoin t by acting in accordance with the image of God a nd less human by
acting in ways that vio late the image), then capac iti es and th e exercise of those capacities play an essential ro le in determining whether the potentia l inherent in the image
of God is rea li zed or not. In th is sense, one can say, as Jo hn Paul does, that a murderer
docs not lose his dignity in thi s sense of hi s onto logica l g irt ofh uman ity by murd erin g,
yet sti ll maintain that th e act of murder very much thwarts the realization of th e individual 's g ift of humani ty in atta ining its full potentia l. Although John Paul docs not
exp li citly de fin e dignity in this way, I believe there are strong gro und s for in terpreting
his conception of dign ity and the Catho li c socia l though t trad ition ' s conception of
dignity more broad ly · as hav in g th ese two interrelated but d istinct components one
given , one atta ined. W hi le a full defense of th is claim requires substantia l add itional
argumentation, it at least helps indicate why John Paul mi ght not be contradi ctin g
himself on thi s point.
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God, Jo hn Paul argues, values every person as a person independently
of their capacities, and, therefore, so mu st we: " fThc] deepest element
of God's com mandment to protect human life is the requirement to
show reverence and love fo r every person and the life of every pcrson. "38
Thi s emphasis on the intrinsic, God -given va lue of all human lite,
in turn , exp lains why John Paul fi·cquent ly descri bes dignity as " inviolable" and "indestructib le." Although located in humans, human digni ty is grou nded in God, and so out of the reach of human attempts to
harm o r destroy. As he writes, "It is th erefore urgently necessary ... to
rediscover th ose essential and innate human and moral va lues whi ch
fl ow from the very truth of th e human being and express and safeguard
the dign ity of th e person: va lues whi ch no individual, no majority, and
no state can ever create, modify or destroy, but must on ly
acknowledge, respect and promotc. " 39 Insofar as dign ity instantiates a
divine truth about who human beings arc- created in God's image and
redeemed by C hri st- there is nothing that the created world can do,
as the passage says, to "create," " modify," or " destroy" that truth. Human beings are intrinsica lly and obj ective ly valuable because God va lues every human being no matter what humans (or anythi ng else in
the created world) do or fai l to do.
Dignity thus can be recognized or fa il to be recognized by other
ind ividuals, societies, cu ltures, states, etc. But whether or not it is recogn ized has no effect on the integrity of the dignity itself. [ndccd,
God 's constituti ve, creative, and redemptive relationship with every
individual creates worth that is, properly understood, " indestructible."
Using the Book of Exodu s to describe the effect that God's love has
on human beings, John Paul exp lains, "Freedom from slavery meant
the g ift of an identity, the recognition o r an indestructible dignity and

38
John Paul 11 , Th e Gospel ojLi/e, 69, docmncnt 's emphasis. The distinct ion between
·'human life" and " human di gnit y" is a basic yci crucia l d istinction in Joh n Paul's
conception of di gnity. /\ t times, he appea rs to emp loy the terms " human li fe" and
"human dignity" as synonyms, as, for exa mple, when he states, "The present encyc li cal. .. is rhcrc lo rc meant to be a prec ise and vigoro us rca rlirmat ion ol'the value of human life and its inviolability" (John Pau l II , The Gospel o/Li/e. 17). Yct he also writes,
"Certa inly the life o/ the hody in its earth Iv slate is not w1 absolute good fo r the believer, espec ially as he may be asked to give up hi s life for a greater good" (Jo hn Paul
II , The Gospel o/Li/e. 17, document's emphasis). Ac tin g in co nformity with the Gospel of Li fc, in other words, may call one to sacrifice her biologica l li fe , which wou ld
not harm one ' s di gnity but, lo lhe contrary, be in accordance with one's digni ty and
even help bring it to its mora l fu lfi ll ment. Human dignil y th us includes human life,
but it is not reducible to human life . This distinction also draws on the disti nction
between human di gnit y being both transcendent and temporal and, consequently, both
vu lnerab le and invulnerable (sec footnote 37 above).
39 John Paul II, The Gospel o/Li/e, I 16, emphasis added .
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the beginning ofa new history in w hi ch th e di scovery o f God and d iscovery of self go hand in hand ."40 Indeed, thi s hu man " identity" as
intrinsically and indestructibly valuabl e is rooted so firmly in the individual that even those who commi t grave moral o ffe nses retain their
equal worth, a claim that explains w hy John Paul ca n affirm , " Not even
a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to
guarantee thi s." 4 1 T his invulnerability of human di gnity to human action, or anything else in the created world, ultimately results from the
invulnerability of its div ine source. "Human life," John Paul concludes,
"i s thu s gi ven a sacred and inviol able character w hi ch refl ects the inviolability of the Creator himsclf. " 42
CONCLU SION

While th e validity or truth-status o f John Pau l II ' s conception of
human worth remains a crucial questi on-one that I deliberately beg
in thi s context- hi s theistic defini tion o f dignity neverth eless provides
a conceptually coherent fo undati on for hi s affirmati on that all human
beings have equal worth . Reca ll , as argued above, that the condition
for the possibility of " un iversality" and "equality," from a conceptual
perspective, is invulnerability to th e poss ibility o f ex tirpation, harm,
and/or enhancement. In recogni zing God as tran scendent and, therefore, inviolable, and, furthermore, by describing thi s inviolable being
as estab lishing an in violab le relati onship with every human individual ,
John Paul can say that hi s account of di gnity is uni versa l and equal
without inconsistency. Given that human worth is grounded in the
non-contingent, there is nothing that we, the contingent, can do to
eradi cate, harm, or, even enhance it. And thi s in vuln erable worth , John

John P aul JI , The Gospel a/Life, 55.
Joh n Paul II , Th e Gospel a/Life 24, document's emphasis.
42
John Paul !I , The Gospel a/ Life, 88. A lth ough John Paul uses the term .. in violable"
to desc ri be di gnity here, I have chosen to use the term " in vulnerabl e" thro ughout th e
arti cle to describe the same characteri sti c. Thi s is not acc identa l. In o ne sense, the
terms could be understood as being interchangeab le: if something cann ot be .. violated" then it is, in a decis ive way, in vulnerable to harm . 1lowcver, draw ing on th e
term 's Latin roots, I want to emphasize th at di gnity must be conceived as someth ing
that literall y ca nnot be " wound ed" in ord er to be de fin ed as uni versa ll y eq ual. I be lieve
" invuln erability" captures this conceptua l necessity more e ffective ly th an .. in v io lability."
That is not to say, however, that di gnity must only be de fin ed as in vulnerable. Al thou gh defending thi s cla im fa lls outside th e ·cope o f this article, I beli eve th ere is a
way to coherently defin e digni ty as vuln erab le to harm (thus necessitat ing that it be
protected and allowed to fl o urish) w ithout sacrifi cing its in vuln erabi lity, and, hence,
universal equality. To do so, one ca n, I be lieve, defi ne di gni ty as both a static ontological qua li ty in a ll human be ings (in vulnerable) and also as a po tenti a l to be rea li zed
(vulnerabl e) . See foot note 37 above.
40

41
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Paul makes c lear, extends to all , regardless of' each individual's distinct set of capacities,
It is crucial to note, however, that John Paul docs not estab lish hi s
conception of universall y equa l dignity independent ly of human capab ilities, To act freely and with purpose, to be able to engage in practical and specu lat ive reasonin g, to immerse oneself in one's own imagination and the imaginations of others, to form fami lies, to love God
and others- these and other capabilities form a fu ndamental part of
our moral identity as bearers of the image of God, But, in the end, they
in no way constitute the sum tota l of our moral identity, In other words,
it is not what we do that morally defines our worth as human beings,
It is who we are: beings created in the image of' God and redeemed on
the Cross. And, unlike Gcw irth and Nussbaum, John Paul ca n coherently say that that va lue-conferring fact app li es to all humans everywhere al l the time in abso lute equal ity, It is a di gni ty ofno exceptions.
This theistic vision of human worth, in the end, raises important
and challenging theological , anthropological , and ep istemological
questions. Given the argument here, one could ask: Is it only the Christian- or Catholi c- conception of the divine that ca n account for universa lly equal human dignity? How arc we to conceive of the image
of God in re lati on to human worth more specifi cal ly, espec ially in light
of the Catho li c and Christian recognition of human sin? How is this
God who gives worth to be known? Docs universa l human dignity ultimately depend on a faith claim that, in turn , is ultimately reducible
to a blind affirmation of religiou s authority? If so, how mi ght these
epistemological restrictions affect the status of di gnity's universality
and equal ity? Also, if human dignity is ultimately invulnerable to
harm, does that ultimately render it a moral ly inert principle? Why, for
example, have rights to protect dignity if it docs not need protection?
These arc crucial questions that a deeper examination of a thei stic acco unt of human dignity wo uld have to answer (and whi ch I have
sought to address clscwhcrc 4 3).
Yet the central issue animat ing th is article still remains: What is
the condition for the possibility of coherent ly describing human di gnity as universa ll y equa l? The answer, it appears, ultimate ly points to
the Transcendent, Ir we wish to define human worth as truly universa l

43

For furth er di scussion sec Matthew P ctrusck, '·Catholi c Social Ethi cs and th e
(ln)vulncrabi lity of Human Dign it y" (Dissertat ion, Univers it y of C hi cago, 20 13),
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and truly equal , we must somehow locate its gro und beyond humanity
44
and outside the reach of human hands. ID

(

44

As a parti ng note, it is impo rta nt to stress th at the ism as it relalcs to human dig nity
can potenti ally acco mmodate a great d iversity of co nceptions o f' th e di vin e, including
those (depend ing on th eir precise th eolog ical interpretati on) generall y attribu ted to th e
three Abrahamic fa iths. In other word s, whi le grea t and irredu cible co nceptual differences exist between Yahweh, All ah, and th e Fath er, Son and Ho ly Spirit, insofar as
each trad iti on's in terpretation of God includ es th e recogn iti on of God 's non-con tingency, agency, and valu e-conferrin g relationship with humans, th ere is no reason,
from a conceptual perspecti ve, why any one of th ese th e isti c concepti ons could not
provide a coherent foundati on for uni versally equal human di gnity " coherent" in th e
sense of being able to account for di gni ty' s universality and equ ality. And so, potentially, with any oth er conception of the d ivine in any oth er reli g ious tradit ion: as long
as it attributes non-contin gency and some kind o f' agency to God, and can describe
how God empl oys God ' s agency to endow all human beings with equ a l worth, th ere
is no reason wh y many different conceptions o f th e di vine could not co herentl y support th e claim "human beings have uni versall y equ al di gnity. " T his is not to say that
any and every such account would be true; it is to say th at every and any such account
could, from a conceptual perspecti ve, potent ially be c:oherent.

